Introduction
Al-Ghaz?l? in one of his major works has
argued that:
They (The ?Ulam?`)duped the people to believe
that there is no
other science than that of Fiqh (Jurisprudence)…They
say that there is no learning
except that of Mun?çarah or debates. The present learned
man cherishes hope
to win over his adversary and seeks means to make him
silent. Or they informed
the people that there is no learning except the science
of scholastic theology
by help of which a speaker seeks to influence the mind
of the public. They see
no other science except these three sciences.
The sciences of the next world (=Ta?awwuf)
and the learning of
the sages of early times(=Philosophy) have disappeared
from the people and the
learning, which was described by God in his Holy Book
as theology, wisdom, light
and guidance, has been immerged in the deepest recess
of forgetfulness.[1]
The first concern, in this paper, is to
define an adequate curriculum
for the philosophical component in U?âl al-D?n. But,
we primarily should try
to understand the meaning of teaching philosophy, absolutely
and relatively
to the formation of an U?âl? scholar. Accordingly, we
should examine these levels
taking into consideration the historical practice of
teaching Philosophy and
U?âl [2], as well as the nature of these two disciplines.
The current situation of Islamic civilisation,
exasperated by
its weakness in scientific and philosophical thought
and by its backwardness
in moral and religious practice, urges us to deeply
meditate the historical
determination of these deficiencies. By doing so, we
keep abreast with the project
of “Islamization of knowledge”. This action may tentatively
medicate the shortcomings
of Islamic academic culture and institution, which became
obvious since the
era of decline[3].
Our purpose in scrutinizing the historical
determination is to
highlight the reasons why our religious thought has,
in almost all our academic
history, negated the conditions of possibility of any
sound scientific and philosophical
teaching; to grasp the reasons why this thought has
reduced the “dignity” of
the scholar or “?Alim” to the religious scholar, and
more particularly, to “faq?h”.
The philosophic and scientific teachings were, therefore,
condemned to a marginal
status: all our philosophers and scientists were self
made men; hence, the theories
they have promoted could not survive them. These theories
were not compatible
with the institutions and the sufficient duration necessary
to produce a rich
theoretical and practical harvest was not made available[4].
No one can accept a proposal for teaching
grounded in a pure accidental
experience, or in the simple aping of the current western
paradigm, which is
as accidental as ours. Thus, we need a philosophical
foundation for the teaching
of philosophy. We should corroborate the Islamic case
by a universal conceptual
vision. We must, hence, deal with the subject in a double
construal of the topic
proposed in this paper: Firstly, an historical construal
must aim at an objective
appraisal of the attitude our culture has had vis-à-vis
philosophy and the status
it has attributed to the teaching of philosophy; and
secondly, a conceptual
construal should try to philosophically, or independently
of inessential circumstances,
define the essential pillars of this teaching.
We have, therefore, to address two difficult
questions, before
trying to design an adequate curriculum for the teaching
of philosophy in U?âl
al-D?n: Firstly, to outline the historical factors which
have caused the inferior
status our educational system has allotted to scientific
and philosophical teaching,
in the two meetings our civilization have had with the
scientific and philosophic
culture: the medieval and the modern. Secondly, to elaborate
upon a philosophical
vision, which would be able to formulate an adequate
design for the teaching
of philosophy. This definition should attribute the
due importance our sound
Islamic critical thought deserves, not only as an Islamic
contribution to the
history of philosophy and sciences, but also to the
cultural, social and political
institutions this contribution has entailed.
These purposes should be rooted in the intrinsic
epistemological
and methodological development of our religious, scientific
and philosophical
thought on one hand, and in the institutional and cultural
shifts this thought
has operated, by comparison with the late Antiquity
and the early medieval eras,
on the other hand. Indeed, this genesis obtained in
the history of Islamic thought
and historical reality, as an antagonistic development
of a dialectic relationship
between two disciplines, which have dominated this thought
and both the intrinsic
and extrinsic institutions which defined it or are defined
by it: 1) The couple
of Fiqh and Ta?awwaf and their intrinsic and extrinsic
institutions, in the
double meaning indicated above owe their development
to an antagonistic epistemological
and institutional dynamic [5]. 2) The couple of Kal?m
and Falsafah and their
intrinsic and extrinsic institutions,[6] have taken
the same way and obeyed
the same dynamic[7].
Finally, we will try to design an adequate
curriculum, able to
achieve two purposes: 1) the sound acquisition of Islamic
knowledge: this curriculum
should equip the U?âl? with the necessary methodological
and logical devices
which enable him/her to understand the Islamic philosophical,
mystical, theological
and legal heritage; 2) the smart acquisition and production
of current knowledge:
this curriculum should enable the U?âl? to participate
actively and not only
reactively in the outlining of the new horizons the
religious thought needs.
Thus, our tentative proposal will try to deal with the
following: the first
problem is historical: how has our culture defined the
status of the teaching
of philosophy and sciences and what is its attitude
vis-à-vis them?, the second
problem is conceptual: how philosophy defines the constitutive
components of
the philosophical teaching?, and the third problem is
procedural: how the teaching
of philosophy contributes in the U?âl? formation?
I-Problem one: the status of scientific
and
Philosophical teaching
To begin with there is a need to address
two important questions
that bear heavily on our discussion; Firstly, 1) How
to define and interpret
the inferior status our civilization has allotted to
the scientific and philosophical
thought in the two experiences of its meeting with it
(The Greek and the European)?
, and 2) How to define and interpret the attitude of
the religious Authorities
towards philosophy and science, in order to equip our
civilization with the
fundamentals of human culture and enable it to achieve
the conditions of private
liberty and public power, in a free and modern society
fit to participate in
the human commune destiny?
As with regard to the first question one
should attempt to examine
the reasons that lay behind the status of scientific
and philosophical thought
in our Islamic scholarship. The victory of the foes
of true practical philosophy
(i.e., Ethics whose supreme end is Religion) on one
hand, and of theoretical
philosophy (i.e. Science and Metaphysics) on the other,
was a disastrous outcome
of a fierce struggle in the history of our academic
and public cultures. The
struggle in itself is universal: we find it in all human
societies. It does
not subject religion and philosophy against each other,
as the biased presentation
of it pretends. It is an eternal battle in all human
societies, between the
true seekers of truth, whether it is religious or philosophical,
and the false
ones. Clearly, we know how the struggle between the
Sophists and Socrates ended:
the condemnation of Socrates to death. Nobody ignores
that Descartes has chosen
the expatriation, because he has been extremely importuned
etc…
Generally this struggle has some positive
consequences. Unfortunately,
the negative result has dominated our civilization.
The decline was a consequence
of the neglect of the positive result of this struggle.
This paper tries to
highlight this historical fact. Some prestidigitators
have succeeded to fake
the role of religious interest's vouchers, leading the
Ummah to believe that
the superior values of Islam coincide with their interests
and privileges. This
confusion has allowed them to exclude any serious establishment
of the conditions
and institutions, a true and efficient theoretical and
practical philosophical
knowledge presupposes. It has also reduced to naught
the efficacy of our religious
knowledge[8].
How can we account for this disastrous aftermath,
without contenting
ourselves with this facile explanation? The bad will
one could attribute to
these scholars, is itself in need of explanation. The
struggle between the good
and bad wills cannot suffice to go forward in promoting
the status and role
of true theoretical and practical knowledge. We must
delve to uncover the reasons
why our two historical encounters with philosophy and
sciences have failed.[9]
The objective conditions in which these two encounters
occurred have generated
an ideological misuse of the philosophical thought and
infested the religious
thought, which have reacted with the same ideological
misuse.
Four laws explain these active and reactive
ideological misuses
and dispense us from futile polemics between biased
sects: the first is physical:
every action produces a reaction of the same nature,
same force and in opposite
direction. This law explains the generation of the two
reactive misuses. The
second is physic-bio-sociological: the law of laziness
(the minimal effort)
accounts for the adoption and use of the prefabricated
theories, even when they
are inadequate, instead of producing the adequate ones.
The third is bio-sociological:
the law of rejection of alien entities by immune system
of every live being
and a fortiori of every superior living being as the
case when we talk about
social entities. This law defines the nature of the
reaction: it is a bio-sociological
rejection of an alien body. The fourth is psycho-sociological:
the law of wastefulness
accounts for the misuse: one can affirm that the relation
the individuals and
collectivities have to the knowledge is of the same
kind as the relation they
have to property: if they do not produce it, they waste
it; this is why the
legacies generally come down to bankruptcies.
Generally speaking, theories made relatively
to the object and
the purpose they intend to explain, as the richness
one has himself produced
cannot have but a sensible use: otherwise, they cannot
be functionally produced
i.e., be sound and adapted to their purposes. Unfortunately,
we have inherited
only prefabricated theories[10]. Only the superficial
forms, cut off from their
conditions of elaboration, can be inherited. The skills,
values, practices and
institutions which render these theories possible are
more difficult to inherit,
or import. This is why the prefabricated theories inherited
or imported were
ready for an abusive use, and wastefulness: the first
misuse in the medieval
era was a political use wrapped up in a biased religious
discourse; the second
misuse in the modern era is also political wrapped up
in a biased philosophical
discourse. In the two occasions, the political use is
nothing but an ideological
misuse of undigested theories.
The misuse of Greek Metaphysics[11] and
European Meta-History[12]
and the reactions they generated are, thus, responsible
for the unfortunate
result we continue to suffer from. In a nutshell, we
can affirm that the intellectual
pathology wherefrom this failure stemmed is the ideological
misuse which had
actively infested our philosophical and reactively our
religious thought: the
extremists of Sh??ah (the misuse of practical metaphysics)
and late Mystic trends
(the misuse of theoretical and practical metaphysics)[13]
have instituted the
medieval crisis; the extremists of Secular (the misuse
of practical and theoretical
Meta-history) and late Esthetic trends (the misuse of
theoretical Meta-history)[14]
have begotten the current crisis. The reactive responses
to these misuses were
of the same kind: two other misuses have corrupted the
religious thought. In
reaction to the misuse of Philosophy, the response was
the misuse of Religion:
in the medieval and modern opportunities, the critique
of the ideological use
was itself ideological. The reactive attitude could
not be marked off from the
attitude it condemned by any positive characteristic.
It was the same, even
if it seemed the opposite: the extremists of Sunnah
and Fiqh, in the medieval
era and the extremists of Anti-secular and Anti-esthetic
trends, nowadays, have
had only one aim to reach: perpetuate the illusion of
possessing the truth by
the same technique of “sadd al-dhar?`i?” or interdiction
which have always prevented
the scientific and philosophical thought to root in
our cultural soil and give
the Ummah the aims of the superior spiritual life and
the means of an independent
and sound historical existence.
As for the second question pertinent to
the attitude of the religious
authorities towards philosophy and science one should
examine the main factors
that created this negative reaction. The diagnosis we
have presented above indicates
the possible ways we should take if we mean really to
achieve a new outlook.
We cannot equip our civilization with the fundamentals
of human culture and
enable it to realize the conditions of private liberty
and public power, in
a free and modern society, without deepening the self
critical work our thinkers
have practiced, as the text of al-Ghaz?l? which has
been cited above demonstrates.
The starting point can be chosen with regard to the
purpose aimed at: our purpose
here is the fruitful teaching of philosophy in order,
first, to educate the
human being and citizen, and second, to mould the would-be
philosophers and
theologians. The aggressive attitude these disciplines
have been shaped with
and the abuse their mutual overlapping or the bad sorting
out the components
of the one from those of the other have entailed, continue
to impoverish our
civilization and to create a double intellectual dictatorship,
till our contemporary
era: that which dominate the religious ?a?wah and that
which dominate the secular
nah?ah.
al-Ghaz?l? has diagnosed this very pathology
of our intellectual
life. This is why he has tried to achieve an original
reformation by a double
inter-insemination[15]: methodological and axiological
inter-insemination of
Fiqh and Mystic, on one hand[16], and epistemological
and ontological inter-insemination
of Kal?m and Philosophy, on the other[17]. The mystical
ingredient (I?y?`) and
the philosophical one (Mishk?t) are the catalyser of
his I?y?` ?Ulâm al-D?n
when purified by his critique of the theoretical use
(Tah?fut al-Fal?sifah)
and the practical use of Philosophy (Fa??`i? al-B??iniyyah)
by a philosophical
component.
This self-critique, it seems to me, has
been continued by Ibn
Taymiyyah and Ibn Khaldân who have deepened the double
inter-insemination proposed
by al-Ghaz?l?, in order to reconcile the core of the
components of any human
thought: the component of axiological, esthetic and
religious disciplines and
the component of ontological, epistemological and philosophical
disciplines.
The condition sine qua non of this reconciliation is,
as Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn
Khaldân has focused on, resides in the uncovering of
the false opposition: "Naql
discarded of ?Aql" and "?Aql discarded of
Naql". They have demonstrated
that the Naql and ?Aql, epistemologically translated,
correspond respectively
to the "factual givennes"[18] and the "rational
conceivedness"[19]
no matter what the nature of the object: either that
of natural sciences or
that of human sciences[20].
This critical solution, if it had been correctly
understood, would
have been a new start for the scientific, philosophic
and religious renaissance.
But the enterprise of deconstructing the theoretical
and practical use of Philosophy
and Religion has been misunderstood by the two parties
of the struggle: al-Ghaz?l?
was attacked by all the parties engaged in the struggle
(Fuqah?`, Mystics, Mutakallimân
and Philosophers).
The outcome of this same enterprise, which
was continued and even
radicalized by Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn Khaldân, gained
impetus in our current
situation. But only the negative result of their audacious
enterprise has lasted.
The conclusion derived from this proto-deconstruction
was, as always, the appeal
to the solution of "sadd al-dhar?`i? or interdiction":
thus Ibn Taymiyya`s
thought was reduced to the islamist and proto-liberal
party which has squeezed
the religious trend of our ?a?wah and Ibn Khaldân`s
to the nationalist and proto-Marxist
party which " fascisised" the Secular trend
of our Nah?ah.
II- Problem two: the six pillars of the
Educational act in the philosophical teaching:
The just ended section has provided us with
a frame of reference
to go one step forward in delineating the main reasons
for the status of science
and philosophy in our Islamic scholarship. In relation
to this problem, two
questions need to be addressed as follows: 1) How to
define and analyze the
specific components, i.e., those proper to the teaching
of philosophy, and 2)
How to define and analyze the generic components, i.e.,
those which frame any
educational system no matter the subject taught.
In the historical component of our study,
we have highlighted
the culmination the Ghaz?l?an proto-deconstruction of
the theological and philosophical
discourse in the work of Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn Khaldân.
This philosophical proto-deconstruction
is germane to the Qur`?nic proto-deconstruction of the
pagan (critique of J?hiliyyah)
and scriptural religious discourse (the concept of Ta?r?f).
It scrutinizes principally
the relationship between ethics and positive law (?ad?th
Quds? and ordinary
?ad?th as possible sources of reconciliation between
Mysticism and Fiqh ) and
the relationship between general Ontology and Special
Ontologies (that of God,
World and Man) (Makkan and Mad?nan Qur?nic verses as
possible source of reconciliation
between Philosophy and Kal?m )[21].
Any teaching system which is philosophically
defined must have
six components: 1) the educational aims of which the
content proposed presents
a sample, 2) the educational means or the managing of
the vehicle of the teaching,
3) the educational ethics or the managing of the body
and spirit of the student,
4) the educational physics or the managing of the space
and time of student
and schooling, 5) the educational economics or the managing
of the two double
functions of the knowledge, 6) and the paidia or the
educational politics i.
e., the determination of the role and place the specific
difference of the human
being must have respectively in the existence of the
person and the collectivity.
Three of the six pillars are presented here,
because their definition
should be specific to the objective of teaching: ethics,
aims or content, and
means or vehicle of the teaching. The other three pillars
are general: they
determine invariably all forms of teaching as we shall
discuss in the coming
sections:
A The three specific components:
Regarding the three specific components
they vary relatively to
the discipline taught: ethics, aims, means of the teaching
of philosophy. The
ethics of the teaching defines the managing of the body
and spirit of the student.
According to the Qur`?nic definition, the method of
teaching used by the Qur`?nic
message is founded on free dialogue and logic argumentation,
or what one may
call the right to good faith errors. In Ibn Khaldân's
view the theory of education
is founded on two principles: the freedom as a condition
of development of moral
virtues and active participation in the apprenticeship
of the pupil and the
dialogue as method of teaching as condition of the development
of intellectual
virtues.
Additionally, the aims define the content
of the teaching. This
includes two important points; firstly, Logical and
ethical skills and virtues
defined by the philosophers. Secondly, Epistemological
and ontological know
how and theories studied by the philosophers.
Which are the aims of the philosophical
education in its far?
?ayn and particular far? kif?yah obligations, i.e.,
the formation of the human
being and citizen in general and the theologian and
philosopher in particular
(the U?âl?)?
a- How can we define the universal dimension
of the philosophical
teaching: “far? ?ayn” related to a general axiological
formation in its double
aspects, i.e., ethical virtues and logical skills?
b- How can we define the particular dimension
of this teaching:
“far? kif?yah” related to a special ontological formation
in its double aspects,
i.e., meta-scientific insights and scientific know-how.
The other important element is the means
that defines the vehicles
of the teaching. This includes biographical examples
related to the aims indicated
above[22] and bibliographical vehicles related to the
aims indicated above [23].
On the other hand one should be aware of
other three important
elements in dealing with teaching philosophy and dealing
with its issues. Theses
three elements are educational ethics, educational aims
and educational means.
Before proceeding further it is worth explaining the
essence and importance
of these elements.
I. Educational ethics:
Two kinds related to the use of aims in
the teaching: not only
as content of the teaching but also as vehicle.This
dimension is related to
the managing of the body and the spirit of the student
and the treatment the
society allots him. This process demands firstly the
application of the ethical
values in the teaching itself in order to form the human
being, the citizen
and specialist and active participation of the student
in the conception and
application of the moral and material managing of the
schooling: at all levels
of teaching. Secondly, the application of the logical
skills in the teaching
itself in order to form the human being, citizen and
specialist and progressive
participation in the conception and application of the
definition of the aims
and means: at the level of postgraduate studies, the
participation must be proactive.
II. Educational aims: two kinds
What are the aims of the philosophical education
in its universal
(far? ?ayn) and particular (far? kif?yah) dimensions,
i.e., the formation of
the human being and citizen, in general and the theologian
and philosopher,
in particular (the U?âl?)? We should think that Islam,
being the universal or
final religion, aims at philosophical education. It
can only be opposed to its
corruption: the distinction between universal and particular
aims and means
has nothing to do with the false problematic of universality
and specificity.
Thus, any pretension of Islamic specificity which reduces
Islam to a specific
worldview[24] opposed to the universal seeking of truth
and values is anti-Islamic,
unless we understand the specificity of Islam as the
negation of any specificity
in human aspiration to theoretical (al-Taw??? bi al-?aqq)
and practical knowledge
(al-Taw??? bi al-?abr): the specificity in these two
domains is the outcome
of the corruption of the human disposition given to
him by Fi?rat All?h. We
can qualify it as ta?r?f al-fi?rah.
Accordingly, the educational aims are to
be classified into two
categories: The universal and particular aims. Regarding
theuniversal aims one
should ask: How can we define the universal dimension
of the philosophical teaching:
“far? ?ayn” related to a general axiological formation
in its double aspects?
To answer this question one should observe two important
elements: One is the
ethical virtues which are the practical virtues related
to the seeking and defense
of the concrete truth (professional consciousness) and
to the persons engaged
in it (al-Taw??? bi al-?abr). The other one is the logical
skills which indicate
the need for heuristic and foundational skills of theoretical
truth (professional
fitness) and discursive and communicative skills (emitter
and receiver) with
others (al-Taw??? bi al-?aqq).
With regard to the particular aims one should
answer the following
question: How can we define the particular dimension
of this teaching: “far?
kif?yah” related to a special ontological formation
in its double aspects.
- meta-scientific insights: logical and
ethical foundation of
the body of knowledge
- scientific know-how: logical and technical
skills to discover
the truth and realize it in reality?
III. Educational means:
What are the means we must use to enable
the U?âl? to carry out
the tasks humanity and Islam are entitled to claim from
him? The tasks humanity
and Islam claim from men should be at once of the same
and unique kind; for,
as a universal religion, Islam should never be an Islamic
Ideology, or an Islamic
worldview amongst others. Islam must be the source of
inspiration to the universal
axiological aspiration, as fi?rat All?h allat? fa?ara
al-n?sa ?alayh?. In thisrespect
one should underscore the importance of universal means
and particular means.
The first one implies the reformation of the educational
and political systems
taking into consideration the practice of the aims indicated
above in the lay
moral civil society with a liberal apprenticeship as
well as the practice of
the aims indicated above in the lay material civil society
space with a liberal
apprenticeship. The second aim presupposes the reformation
of the research and
economic systems, in their relationship to the moral
and material aspects of
the civil society. In line with this one should consider
two points: means of
meta-scientific insights and means of scientific know-how.
B-The three generic components:
These components are necessary to any teaching
no matter the discipline
taught. These components are: 1) Educational politics
that defines the status
and role of the discovery, conservation, diffusion,
and management of theoretical,
practical, technical and esthetical knowledge in the
system of material and
moral values which govern the life of the Community.
2) Educational economics
that defines the two double functions of theoretical,
practical and technical
knowledge: 1- the production and accumulation of Knowledge
or research and achieves,
2- the diffusion and governance of knowledge or the
information and organization
of knowledge. 3) Educational physics that defines the
managing of the space
and time of the student and of the schooling.
The educational politics is the origin
and source of all other
dimensions. It defines the status and role of the seekers
of truth and knowledge
in the value system of the culture as well as the status
and role of the theoretical
and practical knowledge in the production of the material
and moral dimensions
of the social life. The educational economics is responsible
for the production
and accumulation of knowledge and diffusion and management
of knowledge. The
educational physics is related to the managing of the
space and the time of
the schooling and of the student. Regarding the space
and time the student must
study throughout his life every where in the world without
separation between
work and learning as Islam and our academic tradition
stipulate. Concerning
the space and time of the schooling, it is firstly defined
by the spiritual
values, religious organization of time and space, for
example, system of prayers
and religious holidays and secondly by the material
values, professional organization
of time and space. The opposite order of priority is
the one which makes the
man a simple implement of the economic system, as the
case is in the era of
globalization.
III. The curriculum proposed:
After what has been elaborated earlier and
at this juncture of
this analysis it is the height moment to shed some light
on the proposed curriculum.
In this respect two defining questions need to be addressed:
1- How to define the relationship between
philosophy and U?âl
al-D?n?
2- How to concretely design a curriculum
for philosophy in U?âl
al-D?n?
I do not have to expand on U?âl al-D?n.
However, the teaching
of Philosophy in U?âl al-D?n presupposes a deliberate
grasp of their relationship.
I believe that, unless we tell U?âl al-D?n as science
from U?âl al-D?n as defense
of a set of dogma, we will never understand this relationship.
But this distinction
will not suffice. The reason is deeper and more ancient
than this possible confusion
between the meaning of a scientific knowledge of religion
and the meaning of
a dogmatic presentation of it. As a matter of fact,
this relationship has always
been ambiguous: since the shaky definition of it by
Plato and Aristotle.
In the Tenth Book of the Laws, Plato has
tried to determine the
relation between four disciplines: philosophy, theology,
pedagogy and politics.
Aristotle's Metaphysics suffers, even in the triple
character of its title,
from this ambiguity: he proposed, at once, the title
of Metaphysics, Ontology
and Theology. Obviously, the term Ilahiyet has not been
haphazardly chosen by
our philosophers.
Finally, the first design of the canonic
structure of Sunn? ?Ilm
al-Kal?m, proposed by al-B?qill?n? in his Tamh?d al-Aw?`il
wa Talkh?? al-Dala`il[25]
after two centuries of sketchy formulations, even by
the founder of the Ash?arite
school, combine the four routes to "U?âl al-D?n"
as specific knowledge
of U?âl al-D?n as object of this knowledge. These four
routes are: 1)The philosophical
one in which one studies the epistemological and ontological
conditions of the
research in U?âl al-D?n, 2) The theological one in which
one studies the proofs
of God's existence and unity, 3) The mystical one in
which one studies the prophetic
knowledge and life, or the insufficiency of the intellectual
knowledge and worldly
life, 4) The legal one in which nee studies the legal
status of human existence
in this world (politics) and in the Hereafter (eschatology),
in the function
of the relationship with the U?âl al-D?n as defined
by the achievement of the
religious experience i.e., Islam.[26]
These routes are interpretation of the core
of the religious experience[27]:
the history of the religious experience from which Islam
is the final achievement.
This scheme is, in fact, a simple unwitted translation
of the four constituents
the Islamic religious discourse both communicated by
the Prophet (the two constituents
of al-Qur`?n al-Kar?m: al-Makk? wa al-Madan?) and interpreted
by him (the two
constituents of al-?ad?th al-Shar?f: al-Quds? al-?Ad?)
about the Divine Reality
and action in the world, both as historical reality
and conceptual ideality.
This experience (?A?r al-Rasâl) is at once confirmatory
reiteration (mu?addiqun
lim? bayna yadayhi) and critical deconstruction( wa
muhayminun ?alayhi) of all
antecedent religious experiences whose development aims
at Islam, as final and
universal stage of religious experience, wherein the
prophetic knowledge should
coincide with the rational knowledge[28]: the Makkan
Qur`?n (the fundamental
inspiration of true philosophy, as wisdom), the Mad?nan
Qur`?n (the fundamental
inspiration of true kal?m ) the ?ad?th Quds? ( the fundamental
inspiration of
true mystic ) and finely the normal ?ad?th ( the fundamental
inspiration of
true fiqh ).
In this proposal we opt for this universalistic
and transcendental
vision of U?âl al-D?n, as scientific knowledge of the
unifying principle of
all expressions of religion qua religion, the defense
of the dogma being the
subject of ?Aq?dah as catechism. Two principles guide
the pedagogical vision
of our proposal: 1-The cornerstone of any efficient
pedagogical method must
be a balanced one which combines the historical and
the systematic exposition
and teaching of the theoretical discourse; 2- This condition
applies to the
works of the philosophers[29] more than to the works
written about them. So,
the curriculum must achieve two purposes, the realization
of which must be reached
during the undergraduate level and thoroughly and deeply
reviewed in the postgraduate
level with two pedagogical devices.
First purpose: the tools of acquisition
of the Islamic knowledge
in U?âl al-D?n. There are two tools: The formal and
materials tools. The formal
includes: 1) Logic in its wide sense as defined by the
traditional Organon:
Analytics anterior, Analytics Posteriors, Rhetorica,
Dialectica and Poetica.
The best Islamic formulation for an U?âl? is that proposed
by al-Ghaz?l?: Mi?y?r
al-?Ilm. But this formulation must be an expedient,
the original works of Aristotle
are not substitutable. 2) Linguistics as defined in
the Muqaddimah: Grammar,
Philology, Bal?ghah, Literature and linguistics as studied
in Muqaddimah. The
best Islamic formulation for an U?âl? is proposed by
al-Sakk?k?: Mift?? al-?Ulâm.
This formulation too is an expedient; the original works
of all the great scientists
in these fields are unsubstitutable. Unfortunately there
is no unified philosophical
formulation of these sciences unless we accept the Khaldânian
sketchy one in
his Muqqaddimah Whereas, the material tools involves
1) Metaphysics: the original
works of Aristotle, Plotinus, Procleus, Ibn S?n?, Ibn
Rushd etc. 2) Philosophy
of History: the original works of Plato, al-F?r?b?,
Ikhw?n al-?af?, Ibn Khaldân
etc.
Second purpose: the tools of acquisition
and production of current
knowledge in U?âl al-D?n. This also involves formal
tools and material tools.
The first one includes: Modern Logic: the original works
of Frege, Russell,
Wittgenstein, Quine etc. and Hermeneutics: the original
works of Schleirmacher,
Heidegger, Gadamer etc. The material tool includes philosophy
of religion: positive
one: the original work of Hegel as founder of the systematic
philosophy of religion;
Negative one: the original work of Marx as founder of
a systematic critique
of the religion. In addition to Philosophy of Language:
the original work of
Humboldt, Saussure, Wittgenstein, etc.
To further clarify the first tool one should
scrutinize the fact
that the compasses determining the realization of both
aims and means must be
concretely instantiated in the handbooks used in the
teaching: The aims should
be ideology free and as universal as possible. This
is why the compass directing
the definition of the aims must be the History of Philosophy,
which is less
infected by Ideology than the Philosophy of History.
The means should have a
deliberate ideological dimension. This is why the compass
of the means must
be the Philosophy of History. In the two cases, the
object determines the relation
to Ideology. History is more susceptible of ideologization
than Philosophy.
This raises two questions: The first one is: How to
concretely define the aims?
In this respect, we should take into account two elements:
1) History of philosophy
in general, and the history of our philosophy in particular.
And 2) an anthology
of texts wherein our intellectual production must be
sufficiently quantitatively
and qualitatively represented. The second question is:
How to concretely define
the means? The answer to this question requires the
covering of two important
elements: 1) Philosophy of history in general and the
philosophy of our history
in particular, and 2) an anthology of the spiritual
(institutions, values and
arts) and material production (techniques and realizations)
wherein ours must
sufficiently be represented.
To elaborate more on the second tool one
should understand the
fact that the illustration of the curriculum can be
drawn from the determinant
moments of the history of philosophy and from its teachings.
These moments includes
the Islamic and the Western instantiation.
Regarding the Islamic instantiation, one
can identify five moments:
The first moment, represented by the anti-scholastic
Kal?m till the absolute
confusion of Ikhw?n al-?af? which has founded our scholastic
culture. The second
moment is the curriculum which has dominated the teaching
from the specific
beginning of the teaching of philosophy in Islamic culture
till the rupture
with it: i.e., from the curriculum defined by al-F?r?b?
and reformed by Ibn
S?n?. The third moment is the curriculum which has dominated
the teaching of
philosophy from the philosophical revolution till the
absolute rupture with
it i.e., from the curriculum defined by al-Ghaz?l? and
reformed by Ibn Rushd
who has tried to restore the universal curriculum whose
final form has been
given by Aristotle. The fourth moment has tried a new
re-foundation of another
form of philosophizing but that re-foundation has produced
the end of philosophy
in its classical form: Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn Khaldân.
The fifth moment is the
thought of Nah?ah and ?a?wah which have taken two ways
with three principal
formulas of combination of these ways:1- the revival
of the classical Islamic
philosophy, (in the last quarter of the 19th century
till the independencies),
2- the adoption of the western modern philosophy ( after
the independencies),
3- the foundation of the revival on the adoption trend,
4- the foundation of
the adoption on the revival trend (after the failure
of the ideologies) 5-and
the balanced synthesis of the two foundations directly
related to the challenges
of the historical reality of the Ummah (the premises
of the essays the currently
intellectual Islamic travail is promoting).
Regarding the Western instantiation, one
also can identify five
important moments: The first moment is represented by
the scholastic philosophy
which has adopted the strategy of edifying theology
wherein the philosophy is
a simple foundational and logical implement. This moment
has continued till
the reformation and the foundation of the new science.
The second moment has
established a critical curriculum which has dominated
the teaching of philosophy
from the modern philosophical revolution till the rupture
with it which has
produced the last systematic philosophy i.e., from the
curriculum defined by
Descartes and reformed by Leibniz: Kant and Hegel. The
third moment has tried
a new re-foundation of another form of philosophizing
but this re-foundation
has produced the end of philosophy in its classical
form: Comte and Marx. The
fourth moment is the coming back to the style of the
pre-Socratic form of philosophizing:
from Nietzsche on. The fifth moment is contemporary
state of philosophy as social
and literature critique: i.e., as secular Kal?m. This
outcome renders possible
the dialogue of civilization between Muslim and Western
thinkers, because it
liberates them from the metaphysical and meta-historical
prejudges.
Last but not least it is worth mentioning
examples from Western
as Islamic philosophy that will scrutinize the distinctive
features of each
one of them. The design of these examples is to uncover
the essential structure
of a philosophic curriculum. They must be the most representative
examples:
a-Descartes: eight essential components: three propaedeutic
and instrumental
arts[30] Mathematical Paradigm, Method of doubt, Psychology
(The Passions),
the Metaphysical Root, the Physical trunk and three
final sciences or Branches
of the Cartesian philosophical tree (Technique, Ethics
and Medicine) . b-al-Ghaz?l?:
eight essential components: three propaedeutic and instrumental
arts,[31] The
Mystical Paradigm, The Method of doubt, and Psychology
(ma??rij al-quds), The
double deconstruction: of Metaphysic(Tah?fut al-Fal?sifah),
and Meta-history
(Fa??`i? al-B??iniyyah), The double foundation of Analysis
(Science and Physics:
the seventeenth Mas`alah of Tah?fut) and Hermeneutics
(Politics and History:
the positive substance of Fa??`i? ) and the three final
sciences: Mystic, Logic
and Politics ( the bulk of his work).
Conclusion
To conclude: Our third issue was a practical
one: how to use the
history of philosophy and philosophy of history in order
to design the curriculum
and the handbooks of philosophy in U?âl al-D?n, having
in mind the double critical
role philosophy has played in our culture: epistemological
and ethical roles.
Our second issue, was a philosophical one: how to define
the prerequisites of
teaching philosophy in general and in our civilization
in particular, limiting
our enquiry to the solution of the three specific aspects
of the teaching of
philosophy, the three other being general and extrinsic
aspects.
The first task was to assess the place and
role our culture has
allotted to philosophy and its teaching. No answer but
that of al-Ghaz?l?, was
adapted to the situation. The deep meaning and the rationale
al-Ghaz?l? has
used to negatively and positively found the double project
he has initiated,
was already mentioned in the beginning of this research.
Al-Ghaz?l? diagnoses two pathologies of
our Mind and proposed
the remedies his diagnosis entails: 1) How to free our
minds of all verbal rows
and debates which have no aims but to defeat the other
and impose on him silence?
2) How to free our minds of all false sciences which
have no aims but to dupe
the public and influence his mind?
No answer can remedy the academic diseases,
but that al-Ghaz?l?
invites us to practice anew: the sciences of the next
world and the learning
of the sages of early. This exactly is the very definition
of U?âl al-D?n, i.e.,
of the teaching of practical (to know and understand
history and value) and
theoretical (to know and understand nature and truth)
philosophy, which is the
substance of Islam, when his Qur`?nic message is authentically
understood.
A final observation: this paper addresses
the topic as a philosophical
exercise, because one cannot otherwise talk about philosophy.
This is why this
paper begins by a philosophical definition of the hermeneutic
situation in which
our philosophical thought is entangled, and ends by
a practical commitment to
the definition of a real scheme via a philosophical
analysis of the principles
of the solutions proposed. These three stylistic aspects
obey to the fundamental
characteristics of the current philosophical thought.
End Notes
[1] Al-Ghaz?l?, Revival of Religious Learning,
Translated by Al
Haj Fazul Karim, Sind Sagar Academic, Lahore, Pakistan,
1982, Vol.1, pp.9-10.
[2] ?Ilm U?âl al-D?n should be conceived
of as a discipline larger
and deeper than Kal?m and Theology. Unless we accept
to exclude the deep meaning
of U?âl, we cannot think that the identification of
this science with Kal?m
or Theology is legitimate. This science should comprehend
the body of all enquiries
whose subject is the Principles of Religion and whose
method is the ways the
human reason (and intuition) must take to reach these
principles and the phenomena
they ontologically and epistemologically ground. Thus,
?Ilm U?âl al-D?n should
be the architectonical science that establish sound
foundations to the sciences
dealing with these principles: it should be the philosophical
foundation of
their methodological, epistemological, axiological and
ontological principles,
as entities pertaining to the realm of ideas and their
relation with natural
and historical reality. The system of the prophetic
discourse represents, I
believe, the profound structure of this discipline.
The core of U?âl al-D?n,
or the unifying principle of these discourses, resides
in the religious history,
as manifestation of the meta-historical reality whose
ideal essence appears
in al-Qa?a? al-Qur`?n? and whose historical existence
obtains in the very life
of the community with the prophet. This core is expressed
and interpreted in
four discourses unified in a fifth one which should
be their meta-discourse:
1-the pure metaphysical discourse (Makkan Sârahs), 2-the
theological-political
discourse or Major Kal?m (Mad?nan Sârahs), 3-the mystical
discourse (?ad?th
Quds?), 4- the legal discourse (Ordinarily ?ad?th),
5-and finally in the Saint
History as unifying meta-discourse . Hence, ?Ilm U?âl
al-D?n is the science
of the Foundational Unifying principles of five kinds
of U?âl: 1- the Metaphysical
and Met-historical U?âl of the Being in general (Principles
of general and special
Ontology), 2- the theologico-political U?âl which organize
the spiritual (Principles
of the Commuty) and material(Principles of the State)
life of the believers,
3-U?âl of the personal experience of the religious truth(Principles
of the Mystical
experience), 4- U?âl of the legal organization of human
relations, in a community
of free believers who exercise willfully these four
functions (Principles of
Law which are distinct of U?âl al-Fiqh, because non
reducible to the methods
one uses to legislate: they are concerned with the institutional
conditions
capable of assuring the free exercise of the four mentioned
functions), 5-finely
U?âl of the Saint History, as a real total phenomenon
(Principles of Philosophy
of History).
[3] Cf. Abu Yaareb, Critical Review of The
Foundation of Knowledge
by Lu'ay as-Safi, Isl?m?yat al-Ma?rifah, No..14, 1998,
pp.139-166.
[4] As examples, one can propose al-F?r?b?’s
theories of religion,
language and history of sciences, or Ibn S?n?’s tentative
cogito and psycho-physiological
medicine, or Ibn Khaldân’s foundation of human sciences,
or Ibn Taymiyyah’s
"novum organum" for religious and philosophical
sciences, or Kartajanni’s
theory of poesy etc.
[5] The intrinsic institutions the Fiqh
and Ta?awwuf define are
those which frame the production, preservation, diffusion
and management of
the knowledge these disciplines are origin of. The extrinsic
institutions are
the cultural and social institutions which pertain to
the obedience of this
knowledge and the moral authority they exercise: for
example the meager institutions
of Justice and charity for the Fiqh and no less rudimentary
institutions of
expression of public opinion and public superstitious
religiosity for the Ta?awwuf.
The rival relation between Fiqh and Ta?awwuf has no
need of proof. This rivalry
obtains between the knowledge they pretend to be voucher
of and between the
institutions they use and abuse.
[6] The intrinsic institutions of Kal?m
and Philosophy are those
which frame the teaching of these disciplines: quasi
naught, our philosophers
and scientists being generally self made men. The extrinsic
ones are those one
can attribute to the natural sciences (false or true)
the philosophers are supposed
possessors of, and especially Medicine, Astronomy, Alchemy,
Astrology etc...
or from human sciences (false and true) normally object
of the scientific knowledge
of Mutakallimun, and especially Literature critique
(religious and secular),
History (religious and secular), etc.. Here too the
relation is of the same
kind: the same mechanism governs the rivalries between
Kal?m and Philosophy:
it was not an epistemological emulation, but a rivalry
of interests and privileges,
always determined by the degree of the flattery of the
Sul??n and his court,
the signs of any status being the near-mindedness (positive
status) or fare-mindedness
(negative status) relatively to the arbitrariness of
the sovereign.
[7] The dialectic relationship between the
members of these couples
is obvious. But we can affirm that the same dialectic
relationship obtains even
between the couples themselves, i.e., the first couple
(The practical one: Fiqh
and Ta?awwuf) and the second couple (The theoretical
one: Kal?m and Falsafah)
are related by the same law: antagonistic development.
This antagonistic relationship
has created a fracture of the body of scholarship and
generated the following
double alliance in the political and social issues:
the alliance between Ta?awwuf
and philosophy (as knowledgeable authority generally
allied to the opposition)
against the alliance between fiqh and Kal?m (as knowledgeable
authority generally
allied to the government).
[8] The reason is, I believe, the misuse
of the principle of Isti?h?b
al-?al. Instead of introducing a free human legislation
where there are not
A?k?m (ma laysa f?hi ?ukmun huwa ?al? al-nafy al-a?l?
aw ?al? al-bar?`ah al-a?liyyah,
in Ghaz?l?an terms), the principle of laziness has led
our Fuqah?` to the bad
solutions whose aftermath is the rudimentary character
of our institutions:
the solution of farfetched analogy (qiy?s ghayr r?ji?)
or the simple adoption
of the uses. Thus, they have legitimated the adoption
of the political and economical
institutions of the empires whose territories have been
inherited by Isl?m.
This adoption was the principal cause of the failure
we have seen in our political
and economical decline: the Isl?mic revolution was unwittingly
completely negated.
Thus our ?Ulam?` who have reduced U?âl al-Fiqh to the
simple methodological
problem of legal formulation were not aware of the core
of Shar??ah, i.e., the
institutional condition able to organize and manage
the laws and the activities
they govern. Without this meaning the Ijtih?d as way
leading to know and the
Jid?d as way leading to achieve the ?aqq are a simple
fiction in the heads of
the Fuqah?`. This truth is outspoken in two examples.
The first example is the
judiciary system. It was submitted to the arbitrary
of the sul??n and the morality
of the Judge. This is why our history of this institution
is reduced to some
anecdotes related to these two themes. There were no
institutions able to protect
this essential function of any organized life: the simple
knowledge and morality
of the judge and the good pleasure of the sul??n are
not sufficient guarantee
of a good management of justice. The second example
is more eloquent: the system
of inheritance defined by Isl?m became a disastrous
source for the two essential
purposes aimed at by Shar??ah: enhancing ?ilat al-Ra?im
(in the verse of sârat
al-Nis?` which define this institution) between the
believers and boosting the
welfare of the Ummah (without which the Irth al-Ar?
has no meaning). But the
absence of adequate institutions and legal solutions
led to a double disaster:
the property became the very source of negation of ?ilat
al-Ra?im, and the real
condition of neglect of the commune property. Our Fuqah?`
have not seen the
solution inscribed in the system itself, if one has
digged in the meaning of
the fractional system of shares: if the property is
non fractionable (we cannot
have the 1/2 or the 1/3 or the 1/8 of an animal, or
a tree, or a house, or an
enterprise etc.,) the solution cannot be other than
one corn of an alternative:
either the proprietors end the existence of the property
or they invent a system
of management by a third person mandated by them. This
system is the unique
solution adequate with the two finalities and the fractional
character of the
Isl?mic system of inheritance: the symbolic medium sharable
is manageable and
can develop and promote “Irth al-Ar?” and “?ilat al-Ra?im”.
[9] One can define these meetings with philosophy
as "chance
encounters", because they preceded the normal epistemological
development
of the theoretical disciplines in which our culture
has invented or inherited.
Philosophy, as al-F?r?b? has yet highlighted, was not
an autochthon plant, but
an alien one. It has got the normal condition of auto-development:
neither adequate
institutions, nor sufficient duration.
[10] One can state the same proposition
for almost all our institutions,
no matter what their nature; but we do not intend to
digress.
[11] Any knowledgeable scholar generally
knows that the theoretical
and practical theories of ancient and medieval eras
were positively grounded
in Metaphysics (and negatively in Meta-history): either
Platonic, or Aristotelian,
or Plotinian. Ras?`il Ikhw?n al-?af? represents the
very incarnation of this
misuse in its absolute form. The reactive forms cannot
be recited: all the literature
of Sunni thought (Ash?arite and ?anbalite) have unfortunately
these characteristics.
[12] Any knowledgeable scholar generally
knows that the theoretical
and practical theories of modern and contemporary eras
are positively grounded
in Meta-history (and negatively in Metaphysics): either
Cartesian, or Leibnizian,
or Kantian. The Arabic Marxian literature represents
the very incarnation of
this misuse in its absolute form. The reactive form
does not need any instantiation:
all the literature of al-?a?wah is unfortunately of
this kind.
[13] al-Ghaz?l?, Tah?fut al-Fal?sifah: presents
a solution to
the double problem of philosophical analytics and scientific
power.
[14] al-Ghaz?l?, Fa??`i? al-B??iniyyah:
presents a solution to
the double problem of religious hermeneutics and political
power.
[15] Only one dimension of this project
was wittingly conceived
of: the insemination of philosophical skills and rational
virtues in our traditional
sciences. The other B??iniyyah: presents a solution
to the double problem of
religious hermeneutics and political power. Only one
dimension of this project
was wittingly conceived of: the insemination of philosophical
skills and rational
virtues in our traditional sciences. The other constituent
of the project is
the opposite one: the insemination of religious skills
and moral virtues in
the rational sciences. Indeed, the justification al-Ghaz?l?
presents in his
I?y?` is more general. It includes the two aspects:"
Even the religious
learning have become obsolete…They duped the people
to believe that there is
no other science than that of Fiqh (Jurisprudence)…They
say that there is no
learning except that of Mun?çarah or debates. The present
learned man cherishes
hope to victory over his adversary and seeks means to
make him silent. Or they
informed the people that there is no learning except
the science of scholastic
theology by help of which a speaker seeks to influence
the mind of the public.
They see no other science except these three sciences.
The sciences of the next
world (Mystics) and the learning of the sages of early
times (Philosophy) have
disappeared from the people and the learning, which
was described by God in
his Holy Book as theology, wisdom, light and guidance,
has been immerged in
the deepest recess of forgetfulness." (al-Ghaz?l?,
Revival of Religious
Learning, pp.9-10).The critique of Metaphysics (Tah?fut)
and Meta-History (Fa??`i?)
cannot be reduced to its negative dimension. The Tah?fut
tells the real scientific
knowledge of natural phenomena from the dialectical
discourse called Metaphysics
and define the analytical criteria capable of distinguishing
the scientific
truth from the ideological one, as presented by the
metaphysical pretensions
of the philosophers; the Fa??`i? distinguishes the scientific
knowledge of human
phenomena and defines the hermeneutical criteria susceptible
to sort out the
scientific truth from the ideological one, as presented
by the arbitrariness
of B??inyyah`s interpretation of the religious texts
and the historical events
of Isl?m.
[16] This first Ghaz?l?an intension is famous:
it is the rationale
of the project of I?y?` ?Ulâm al-D?n strictu sensu.
[17] The lecture of al-Qis??s al-Mustaq?m
suffices to understand
the second intension of the project al-Ghaz?l? cherishes.
[18] The concept of Manqâl in "?a???
al-Manqâl" has
two meanings: it can be Manqâl ?ab??? = the facts of
physical and historical
experiences, or scientific discourse and deeds about
them; or Manqâl Shar??
= the facts of religious and historical experiences
or of prophetic discourse
and deeds. Thus, the Novum Organum of Manqâl must be
here double: the method
of experimental natural knowledge and the method of
experiential historical
knowledge: the problem, in the two cases, is: how to
establish the facts of
experience, without or within.
[19] The concept of Ma?qâl in "?ar??
al-Ma?qâl" has
two meanings too: it can be Ma?qâl al-?ab??? = the axiomatic
presentation which
defines the hypotheses and the procedures of any natural
descriptive discourse;
or Ma?qâl Shar?? idem for any ethical normative discourse.
Therefore, the Novum
Organum of Ma?qâl must be here double: the method of
analytic discourse for
"axiometizing" the natural sciences= mathematics
and logic; and the
method of hermeneutic discourse for "axiometizing"
the human sciences=
hermeneutics and linguistics.
[20] There is an epistemological paradox
in the critical work
of these thinkers. Ibn Taymiyyah has systematically
criticized the ancient organum
(Aristotle's logic) of the philosophical knowledge;
but his proposals about
the novum organum (His alternative logic) was sketchy;
his proposals about the
novum orgnum in religious knowledge was systematic (structural
hermeneutics
to interprete al-Qur`?n and historical enquiry to establish
religious tradition);
but his critique of the traditional one was sketchy.
One can say exactly the
same thing of Ibn Khaldân; but in opposite sense respectively
to all these terms
of the epistemological Isl?mic situation of knowledge.
[21] The possible cases of fundamental theological
struggle may
be determined by the Cartesian product of the elements
members of this set plus
two, and the multiplication of the result by four levels
of consideration, i.e.,:
{[(4x4) =16] + 2 (the affirmation and negation of the
set) x 4 (the four possibilities
of considering the 18 cases each in itself or relatively
to the reality it is
about, in itself or actively and passively, i.e., the
text, the reality and
the two sense of the relation between them) = 72. (One
can, even ironically,
compare this with the theory of al-Baghd?d?, about the
73 firqah. The 73 Firqah
being, for us, the set whose subsets are the 72 ones
mathematically deduced:
this global set is the firqah al-N?jiyah, i.e., every
mujtahid is blessed)
[22] Some sets of thinkers represent this
universal conception
without ethnical or cultural distinction. But, for historical
and cultural reasons
we must attribute to our thinkers the importance they
deserve in the universal
pantheon:
1-First set: Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus,
Proclus etc.
2-Second set: al-F?r?b?, Ibn S?n?, al-Ghaz?l?,
al-Suhraward?,
Moll? ?adr? etc.
3-Third set: Ibn Qurr? (grand son of), Al-B?rân?,
Ibn Al-Haytham,
al-Khayy?m,
At-?âs?, etc.
4-Fourth set: Ibn ?azm, Ibn B?jah, Ibn ?ufayl,
Ibn Rushd, Ibn
?Arab? etc.
5-Fifth set: Descartes, Leibniz, Newton,
Hume, Kant etc.
6-Six set: Herder, Goethe, Fichte, Schelling,
Hegel, etc.
7-Sixth set: Marx, Comte, Nietzsche, Husserl,
Heidegger etc. The
core of the equation of the teaching of Isl?mic Philosophy:
al-Ghaz?l?, Ibn
Taymiyyah and Ibn Khaldân.
[23] It is obvious that the bibliography
should be elected from
the works of the philosophers chosen by the curriculum
as examples of the aims
targeted, as we will do in the curriculum proposed by
this paper.
[24] The pretension of a specific Isl?mic
worldview is the source
of two spiritual malformations and two correspondent
social diseases: 1- internal
malformation, generating a continual civil war between
the firaq, because each
of them pretends to be the unique possessor of this
unique worldview; 2- external
malformation, generating a pathological reactive attitude:
this worldview is
always defined by the negation of an imaginary adversary
generally identified
with the false ghost of Occident, germane of the same
false entity called Orient.
Isl?m should be conceived of as a matrix of infinity
of worldviews as Nature
is a matrix of infinity of cosmologies. As a matter
of fact, the Saint Qur`?n
defines the religious (axiological and historical) and
the natural (= epistemological
and ontological) phenomena as Ayat or Kalimat All?h.
Thus they can not be confounded
with any conception or interpretation one can have of
them. They transcend any
knowledge one pretends to have got of them: this must
be the deep meaning of
the concept Ijtih?d as alternative to the spiritual
infallible authorities in
corrupted religions. If it is ridiculous to think that
the nature is the one
of the cosmogonies one can imagine, it is ridiculous
too to think that Isl?m
is one of the worldviews one can imagine.
[25] Cf. Al-B?qillan?'s, Tamh?d al-Aw?`il
wa Talkh?? al-Dal?`il,
edited and published by ?Im?d al-D?n A?mad ?aydar, 3rd
edition (Beirut: Mu`assast
al-Kutub al-Thaq?fiyyah, 1993), pp. 23-24.
[26] The routes one and three are the open
ones. The routes two
and four are the closed ones. If we consider Isl?m from
the horizon of the open
routes, the philosophical and mystical visions obtain.
If we consider it from
the horizon of the closed routes the theological and
legal visions obtain. The
first double access to the religious experience represents
the universal and
transcendent dimension of Isl?m: Makkan Qur`?n and ?ad?th
Quds?. The second
access to the religious experience represents the particular
and historical
Islam: Mad?nan Qur`?n and normal ?ad?th.
[27] This is why the discipline of Comparative
Religion, in its
double sense, (intrinsic: an-Ni?al; and extrinsic: al-Milal)
is included in
the project of al-B?qill?n?, even if he hesitates between
the two poles above
indicated: philosophy of religion on one hand and defensive
panegyric of one
vision of the religion on the other, i.e., the Ash?arite
one. The discipline
has always swung between these poles we have seen: it
is rarely universalistic
and transcendentalist and consider all religions as
development and evolution
(by essay and error: as one can understand the deep
meaning of al-Qa?a? al-Qur`?n?)
of the same tree whose final outcome is Islam; but it
is often particularistic
and historicist and consider all other religions false
ones, whose development
is the depart form the true religion, or Islam. These
two attitudes stem from
the two antagonistic visions we have mentioned. The
debate B?qillan? and Ibn
?azm have expanded to include the negation of rational
truth (Sophists and Pyrrhonists)
and prophetic truth (The two theses of negation of prophecy)
means that the
universalistic trend was present.
[28] This is concept of End of Meta-History
(= beginning of aware
History), conceived of as infinitesimal theoretical
convergence between religious
and philosophical Ijtih?d? knowledge and as a practical
convergence between
religious and political Jih?d? action; the task being
the historical realization
of the divine laws: al-taw??? bi al-?aqq wa al-Taw???
bi al-?abr.
[29] In the works of philosophers, the historical
determination
is intrinsic, because the original works are essentially
polemical (as debate
with the philosophies they try to refute) and systematic
ones (as foundation
of the system they try to construct). Therefore, the
original works are paradigms
not only of the philosophical theories but also of the
styles of philosophizing.
The learning of the latter is more important than the
former.
[30] These disciplines are neither indicated
nor recited in his
famous philosophical tree. Their nature is indefinite.
They pertain neither
to Metaphysic (the root) nor to Physics (the trunk)
nor even to the three branches
of the tree. Their nature is therefore reducible to
their function: paradigm
of rationality, psychological obstacles to knowledge
(passions) and the method
as compromise between these two dimensions of the mind.
These disciplines which
are out of the three components of the tree represent
its true root. As for
the branches, their structure is of the same kind: the
dualistic vision of Descartes
renders the Medicine a middle term between Mechanics
and Ethics because the
human body as a simple machine obeys to the science
of the Matter (Space and
Movement) and the mind to the science of the Spirit
(Volition and Reason). The
correspondence between Method and Medicine is clear:
the method is a preventive
medicine and the medicine is a curative method in Cartesian
terms.
[31] The reason why we have chosen to begin
our instantiation
by a Western example is obvious: the functions of the
components of the system
and their inter-relations became more understandable
in modern philosophy. al-Ghaz?l?
has never written treatises related to the teaching
of Philosophy, like the
Principles of Philosophy of Descartes. His Maq??id al-Fal?sifah
is a simple
epitome of the philosophical knowledge in order to refute
it, even if this book
has played a great role in the teaching of philosophy
both in Latin Occident
and Isl?mic Orient. But the propaedeutic disciplines
and the branches of the
trunk of his "tree" in his work have the same
functions and nature.
Therefore, we have not to repeat the same analyses.
However, the difference
of the epistemological paradigm and of the branches
of the tree deserves a little
comment. The mathematical paradigm is different of the
mystical one, only by
the subject matter. As a matter of fact, the mode of
mathematical knowledge
Descartes promotes is not that of an Euclidean demonstration;
but that of the
intellectual intuition (Cf. above all his Regulae),
as the mode promoted by
al. As for the difference of the branches, one can say
that, in this case too,
it is related to the matter subjet of knowledge and
not to its nature: the knowledge
they vision pertains to the arts of domination, which
is in Cartesian thought
physical (Essentially Physical or Natural sciences),
and in al-Ghaz?l?an thought
moral (Essentially Moral or Human science
